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The evolution of cyberspace from ARPAnet to the Internet and now a domain of military interactions warranting its own combatant command has been rapid and extensive. The number of connected devices now exceeds 17 billion and will continue to grow in the coming years. For all the benefits afforded by the development of cyberspace it is also a domain rife with crime, espionage and conflict. Rarely does a day go by in which news stories do not discuss some new cyber-attack, theft or espionage activity. As cyberspace has developed and increased in importance to the economy and to national security, considerations on how to foster deterrence have increased. To date, with some notable exceptions, most conversations on deterrence have focused on activities that threaten punishment to or denial of adversaries. Analyses frequently make parallels back to cold war deterrence strategies that emphasize the logic surrounding nuclear weapons. A variety of scholars of international relations and technical specialists view strategies heavily focused on threatening retaliation or on denial as unsatisfactory when applied to cyberspace. These strategies remain unsatisfactory because cyberspace has unique characteristics which undermine key components of deterrence including credibility, signaling, specificity, attribution and decision-making. Entanglement is worthy of examination because it alters the costs and benefits matrix from ante-impetum (pre-attack) and post-impetum (after-attack) to one that emphasizes the management of risk aversion and risk seeking through a continuous relationship between parties. Entanglement as a strategy seeks to enhance benefits such that it creates a disincentive (risk aversion) and minimizes risk seeking by an adversary.
Conceptualizing
The challenges associated with deterrence at present are centered on an inability to establish credibility in both denial and threatening activities in to extend the shadow of the future outward to create a more robust steady state. Extending beyond Axelrod, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky established that humans are inherently predisposed to different concepts of risk predicated on changes in the reference point of actors. By combining these scholarly works and those that followed, the potential for entanglement as one strategy for fostering deterrence and stability in cyberspace is derived.
Entanglement focuses on mutual establishment and recognition as well as perception management of benefits both in the present and over time. By shifting the focus away from punishment and denial entanglement seeks to alter the reference point from risk seeking behaviors commonly found within conventional deterrence modeling to risk aversion. Entanglement both alters the calculus of states interactions and extends out the shadow of the future.
Areas such as information sharing and analysis centers within critical sectors such as finance and energy, the development of heterogeneous and diverse markets inclusive of software and hardware from diverse ecosystems, the establishment of global supply chains, and the broadening and deepening of ties with key strategic allies all coalesce to entangle potential adversaries.
Moreover, as entanglement deepens so too does risk aversion.
Entanglement between conventional allies further raises the costs for non-allied interventions as it creates systemic hands tying behaviors across countries and sectors. It also discourages allies from breaking with one another for fear of losing the benefits of entanglement. Moreover, entanglement with traditional or potential adversaries can serve as a self-deterrent mechanism that promotes risk aversion. For example: because China benefits from US and European markets it is dissuaded from harming them with cyber-attacks that degrade/deny, destroy or disrupt or in any way damage their existing benefits both in the short and the long-term. If further entangled, China might also be willing to provide information to enhance resilience or counter threats by third parties that might adversely impact their own benefits. By more thoroughly entangling both friend and foe the aggregate benefits for maintaining and enhancing good behavior within the cyberspace increase and reinforce risk averse behaviors. 
